




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Agenda

- Abu Ghraib
- Salah Ad Din
- Ninewa
- Diyala
- North Babil
- Anbar
- Patterns
- Questions



Initial IPB Focus: Locations of the initial change in individual mindset and local cessation violence along key support zones and LOCs for accelerants in Baghdad

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Abu Ghraib


The map shows the Abu Ghraib area with various tribal boundaries. Key figures are identified with photos and labels:

- Sheik Thaher Khamess Al Darl**: Head of Abu Ghraib Zoba'i Tribe
- Meshan Khamess Al-Darl**: Supreme Zoba'i Sheikh
- Zoba'i Tribe**: Labeled on the map
- Abu Ghraib**: Labeled on the map
- Thamer Kaddam Zaidon**: Abu Azzam
- Sheik Bakr Khamis**: Timimi Prince
- Sheik Sohail Hussein**: (Bakr Khamis' brother)
- Sheik Abdul Rachman**: Son of Sheik Thaher Khamess
- Actual Spokesman/Running the Tribe**: Labeled on the map

Timeline of Events:

- Nov 06 – Timimi Tribe requests to cont to carry weapons in village
- Dec 06 – Tribal meeting with PM for discussion of Salvation Comm similar to Anbar with Dulayme, Al-Esowi, Timimi tribes (Zobai)
- Jan 07 – MTGs with MNF-I and Abu Azzam
- 24 Jan 07 – MNF-I, MNC-I, Abu Azzam, and BG Nassir
- Feb 07 – Introduction of Abu Azzam to 2-5 Cav
- 14 Feb – Order to BG Nassir to break contact
- 27 Feb – On the verge of AAS, JM, JAI announcement
- Mar 07 – Cooperation between Zobai & Timimi tribes

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Abu Ghraib


Environmental Assessment

- Key link to Zobai in Anbar – specifically Zaydan (MNF-W)
- Zobai engaging AQ in vic of Zaydan
- Negotiations provide the link from AG to Fallujah Police Chief COL Feisel
- Proof of progress in development of coalition of AAS, JM, and JAI
- Key area between the activity of FAQ in East and SAA/SAI in West

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Abu Ghraib



Key drivers for alliance formation


- Approach and distrust of Muthana Bde
- Heinous attacks by AQI (Desire to Protect their home and Land)
- Monetary and influence
- Battle lines between AQIZ and 1920 Revolutionary Brigade center on the Abu Ghrayb Canal, with 1920 Revolutionary Brigade on the north side and AQIZ on the south side.

Key risks

- Fragile alliance – pressure from loss of funds and protecting Sunnis from AQ and the Muthana Bde.

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Salah Ad Din



Environmental Assessment

- Many well-educated, former regime military and political elites are in SaD; population probably possess greatest latent threat to AQI if local groups begin to target them consistently
- Most AQI violence directed at CF/ISF; civilians not as targeted as in neighboring provinces. AQI generally maintains reasonable interactions with local Sunni population compared to other provinces, possibly out of fear of antagonizing SaD Sunni tribal leadership
- Most tribal leaders are broadly anti-AQI and resent declaration of ISI, but tolerate 1.4b, 1.4c, 1.4d
- The provincial government is relatively representative and provides the primary vehicle to reach tribal and other political leaders. Interactions with Gol, however, are poor.
- In more problematic areas like Samarra, Sunnis are not as strong, caught between AQI, Shi'a ISF
- AQI avoids Shi'a strongholds like Balad and does not emphasize stoking sectarian violence

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Salah Ad Din



Key drivers for possible alliance formation

- Jabouri tribe, currently have a honor feud against AQI because of the kidnapping of Sheikh Naji. They are the most powerful tribe and could probably unite others in their cause.
- The sheiks council and many of the tribes in SaD are vocally against AQI and reporting indicates that some tribes have engaged in fighting with AQI
- Tribal leaders would be willing to unite and remove

1.4b, 1.4c, 1.4d

1.4b 1.4c 1.4d

Key challenges

- Relatively minimal effort by AQI could resolve tensions with groups, including Jabouri honor feud
- AQI is not yet perceived as the primary enemy for majority of local tribes and political leaders; greater concern is for the Shi'a-led Gol

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Ninewa

March 2007

Sheikh Abdullah Homaid al-Aql al-Yawr:
Shammari Tribal Chief of Ninewa.
• Sheikh Yawr is the cousin to the Paramount Shammari Sheikh Mushin Nayif al Yawr al Faisal al Shammari and to former Iraqi President Ghazi Al Yawr.

April 2007
The Shammar tribe, due to the Tal Afar bombing, was looking for help from MNF-I to combat AQI.

Sheikh Mushin Nayif al Yawr al Faisal al Shammari:
Paramount Sheikh of the Shammari Tribe; currently resides in London.
• Took over after Sheikh Sha'lan Mushin al-Faysal al-Shammari (AKA Sha'lan al-Jarbah) was assassinated in Mosul.
• In early April 2007, Sheikh Mushin met with Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad.
• The sheikh wanted to get help from the government to fight AQI in Ninewa.

No Photo

AQI movement through Ninewa

Opportunity

are weary of AQI and there is a building consensus to expel them from the province.

are weary of AQI and there is a building consensus to expel them from the province.

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Ninewa



Environmental Assessment

- Great potential for informal alliances against AQI. Such efforts are in their infancy and will require substantial CF, Provincial and Gol support.
- Ninewa is critical for AQI freedom of movement and LoCs. AQI will fight hard to retain.
- Attacks targeting predominantly ISF and CF. Considering the lack of collateral damage, with noted exceptions like Tal Afar, the popular will to actively suppress AQI activities is minimal with personality driven cooperation between the two dominant forces in Mosul, AAS and AQI.
- AQI draws on Sunni fears of Kurdish expansion, Shi'a threat from ISF/JAM/Badr, 1.4b, 1.4d Gol
- Most tribal leaders are anti-AQI and resent declaration of ISI, but generally tolerate AQI activities
- The dominant Shammar tribe depends on smuggling for its revenues. While the paramount sheikh, Mushin al-Faisal al Yawr al Shammari, is calling for confrontation with AQI, one of his sub-tribes facilitates AQI's smuggling activities from Syria
- The provincial government is not representative of the local population; relations with Gol are poor

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Ninewa



Key drivers for possible alliance formation


- The tribes, especially the Shammar, are attracted to the Sahawa al Iraqi (Iraqi Awakening) movement in Anbar, and may be looking towards establishing their own Awakening movement

Key challenges

- Kurdish ambitions to incorporate portion of Mosul could potentially anger the Sunnis and Turkomen enough to let AQI operate in their area, if AQI agrees to target Kurds
- Finding alternative funding sources for the Shammari sub-tribes which facilitate AQI smuggling
- Personality driven cooperation between the two dominant forces in Mosul, AAS and AQI. Substantial political carrots, which currently do not exist, will be required to lure reconcilable elements of AAS away from current operations.

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1.4c



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Diyala



Environmental Assessment

- Large volume of reporting discussing tribal coalitions forming to counter AQI influence and directly combat AQI forces beginning in late 2006, early 2007. Tribal coalitions for reconciliation and anti-AQI efforts are in their infancy and will require substantial CF, Provincial and Gol support.
- b 6 pushed more AQI and JAM into Diyala, accelerating violence on all sides
- Larger anti-AQI coalitions formed among Sunni insurgents groups, then temporarily between insurgents groups and JAM, then finally at broader local political level with assistance from CF, Gol and Awakening tribal model from Anbar
- Disproportional Shi'a representation in the provincial government and ISF set stage for sectarian violence; inhibits effective governance, security response
- AQI targeted Diyala as key part of national strategy; pushing in from west late 2006, stoking sectarian violence, attempting to dominate key terrain; JAM responded to attacks on Shi'a population by expanded presence

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Diyala



Key drivers for possible alliance formation


- Kinetic exhaustion by combatants in an intense multi-polar fight.
- Recognition that AQI poses greatest enemy to all groups at this time
- Lessening of JAM activity has helped Sunni elements focus on AQI
- Diyala Support Committee helping to address cooperation against common threats


Key challenges

- Diyala essential for AQI current strategy; will fight hard to hold position
- AQI can continue to exploit Sunni fears of Shi'a government, ISF
- Numerous tribes, other political players makes alliances, cooperation difficult to coordinate

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North Babil



Environmental Assessment

- NBTC is not anti-AQI coalition or a Salvation Council. Designed to provide better representation to GoI and improve cooperation for local security
- Made up of both Shia and Sunni tribal groups
- Pressure from JAM and Shi'a provincial leaders as well as neglect by GoI, are greater security and political concerns, as opposed to AQI
- Sunni tribal groups unwilling to provide 1.4c on AQI due to lack security

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North Babil



Key drivers for possible anti-AQI alliance formation


- NBTC member groups want to improve security, find solution to dual pressure of AQI and Shi'a militia
- CF support in developing better local security (PSUs, etc) may allow greater willingness to focus on combating extremist elements in area

Key challenges


- AQI is not yet perceived as the primary enemy; most groups lack security to challenge AQI or even provide 1.4c other support
- Gol, Babil Shi'a leaders may resist arming majority Sunni groups in the Southern Belts

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Anbar



Environmental Assessment

- Realization that AQL's long term interests were fundamentally at odds with the interests of the tribes
- Tribes will act ICW MNF because they believe it best serves their immediate objectives while keeping open options over the longer term

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Anbar

Key drivers for alliance formation

- Varied by AO based on assessment of how cooperation could benefit tribal interests
- Large factor in decision of some leadership figures to flee Iraq: threatened by cooperation

Key risks

- Tribes accept risk when they see return. Should objectives for MNF or the tribes change relationships become imperiled
- Inability MNF to honor commitments will allow alliances to become very fragile and possibly motivate the tribes to peruse other objectives and act to attain them

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
Patterns



- AQI must be seen as the greatest common enemy in a multi-polar fight (tribes, Sunni insurgents, Shi'a militia, ISF, CF) before local elements are willing to actively work against Sunni extremists
- Sunni elements must also believe they have the capability to fight before confronting AQI, especially in environments when the groups are also under pressure from Shi'a militia or ISF. Police Support Units appear to be an effective way to address these issues.
- Elements must have support from GoI to be sustainable
- Financial incentives remain a powerful motivator for both AQI and Sunni tribes, and can be use as levers against each other
- Underlying sectarian conflicts, if present, must be addressed to some degree prior to forming anti-AQI coalitions. Shi'a militia activity and Shi'a ISF excesses in mixed areas must be reduced before Sunni local elements will feel confident to focus on AQI
- Anti-AQI coalitions will likely take on both security and political forms; effective integration will be need by ISF and GoI on both accounts

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